

MacArthur.19
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Rough list of "puzzles":

Given change in strategic environment, and accounts of MAD planning,

1. Why did plans sound so familiar, and concepts?
--Because planning had never changed.

2. But why?

3. Why weapons of this type? FS, CF, etc.

--not only did technology permit this; but they were suited to plans.

But this meant heading into a new world, never existed before; the world of preemptive instability. LIKE WWI. The world feared when we worked on these plans, and the missile gap. At that time, no possibility seen of arms control; now it is. So,

4. But since this headed toward instability, why was no effort to head this off by arms control? The answer that technology or inertia of thinking was dominant did not seem adequate, given the costs and the risks.

5. Some now said that at this level of armaments the risks weren't really great--were they right: was this reliable? What was happening to the risk of war? (Public thought high and steady; experts thought low and steady. I wasn't confident that either were right in their inference that the arms race affected only costs, not the danger of war. (DY: public thinks ...experts think...))

--Meanwhile, I was pursuing a trail of evidence, at first virtually alone, that began to point to new answers to these questions...

--In 1981 I summarized, for the first time in print, the evidence then available....

Since most of the instances remain unfamiliar, even to well-informed analysts, I include it here.

...

[later, under Project:

--References to the open sources then available are in Call to Mutiny, with some extended quotations. Since then, investigations stimulated by this paper have turned up many more documentary sources, and others have been declassified: e.g., For

Rel volumes on Korea....In 1985 Nixon caused a flurry by confirming his consideration of nuclear threats--omitted from his memoirs, and those of Henry Kissinger--the first time a President had done so since Eisenhower's (little noted) reference in his memoirs. He added some to this list. Just this month, an article in Armed Forces Journal led to investigations by NYT reporter ...who added yet another, recent and previously-unknown episode of Presidential involvement in secret nuclear crises, in August, 1980((in standard fashion, Carter's brief reference to this in his memoirs makes no mention of the nuclear dimension).

One question for investigation in this study: How many others are there? What more can be learned, by FOIA or interviews, of their details, for comparative analysis? (My particular research specialty, as on the Pentagon Papers or my previous crisis study, where I took advantage of several series of previous studies--for which I was granted special access, and clearances higher than Top Secret--). But already enough is known to permit some comparison and test some preliminary hypotheses.]

--A striking aspect of this list is the number of occasions in which nuclear weapons were used for threatening in the Third World: and --except for the Cuban Crisis--all against non-Soviet, non-nuclear opponents, in a conflict that showed no possibility of "going nuclear" except by US initiative.

This dramatically contradicted the public's impression...DY. But if experts knew better, it was because they knew of the NATO commitment. (The FU/NFU controversy has focussed almost exclusively on Europe and NATO. Likewise, the earlier neutron warhead controversy--even though I had known from its "birth" that its "father" had had TW conflicts like Korea in mind. The experts were no more aware than the public that nuclear weapons had so often been even considered in the TW.

Moreover, the public, like the Catholic bishops, think that nuclear weapons should not be used--even in Europe. They might be more tolerant than the bishops of threatening their use, if the threats were carefully-controlled bluffs, with no likelihood of being carried out if they failed (as in 1969 under Nixon). But is that the case? How close is close? How to measure this? (See controversy over Armed Forces Journal: quotes.

--See implications for democracy (secrecy, ignorance).

Values--vital interest" (ASJ) applies to all these cases; what of Third World: what in these conflicts justified a risk of using nuclear weapons; what, a risk of all-out nuclear war? (See JFK in Cuba.) How did leaders see this...e.g., as they entered conflicts?

(It turns out that many presidents have had occasion to address that question...and we don't know any of their answers, starting with JFK's...see RFK...It is time we asked the right questions and demanded answers; but ultimately it is for us, citizens in a democracy to answer RFK's question. That is our

responsibility and our opportunity.)

Another risk: might these have led to all-out war? There, notice that all TW opponents were SU allies... Problem, of deterring a Soviet response. Note Ike; and JFK.

Implications of this for strategic arms programs. Hyp:... This has startling power. It can predict: FS character; tolerance of instability; limits of arms control proposals. Addition to factors (and single one of explanations that explains all of these) (when added to hyp. that NATO defense also leads in this direction; TW incentives--justifying risk of nuc war

How to substitute for Superiority? Note mentions of madness, risk of losing control: What if this were seen as a substitute-making it dangerous for Soviets to retaliate? Could a limited amount of instability--not only hypothetical but "real" be tolerated deliberately, allowed to emerge and remain? Hyp...

--Implications for risk of war: that current trends are more dangerous (when considering instability in light of possible first use) than often seen; thus that arms control is more urgent, yet requires almost entirely new proposals than those addressed by Admin. That prolif is more dangerous, if others simply imitate US practice. That requirements for triggering all-out conflict may actually be met, not only by accident but, in certain crises, by deliberate Presidential decision. That chances for accident and mistake may be greater--and kept greater for policy reasons--than is imagined.

--Issues of public morality: One reason public is wrong about threats is assumption that FU and even threats would be wholly illegitimate in TW conflicts, given stakes (note secrecy about threats). But does government officials have bad conscience about this? And if they did--might they carry out threats anyway? Could they get their orders obeyed? When might they take risks of...moral and political catastrophe?

(I was already led to study of strategic bombing, VN: led to awareness that officials had a different code since WWII; expressed in tolerance of allied terrorism and use of it ourselves, but above all in bombing plans, threats, and practice. Just Terrorism.

PROJECT:

To explore implications of US official readiness to threaten to initiate tactical nuclear war outside Europe (as well as in Europe) for: 1) strategic arms programs and posture; --and for Soviet programs, (response to US, and response to similar motives)

2) arms control policy;

3 the risk of actual US use of nuclear weapons in the TW

4) risk of all-out nuclear war

5) moral and psychological universe of national security managers, including the President

6) the scope, interests and values, and risks of US foreign policy towards the TW.

Second, from any reinterpretation that emerges of past and current policy and its past and future risks, to examine alternative policies that would reduce these risks and better meet American needs, perhaps differently defined, and to consider reformulated policies in the areas of arms programs, arms control, US relations with the Third World and Europe, and democratic control of foreign and military policy.

Questions:

1. What is knowable about these instances? I will gather material, collect documents from other researchers and government, possibly make FOIA requests and conduct some interviews, or encourage others to do so. Make comparative study. Utilize notes and inferences from my crisis study; and my own past work on bargaining and threat theory, brought up to date (with some review of recent literature).

--What is evidence of influence of these on Soviets? What evidence of similar motives, perhaps respecting East Europe? (Early phase of this; possible discussion with Soviets; reading).

2. What are the requirements for strategic programs of enhancing the credibility of FU threats?

My own expertise. Statements of Reagan officials, little noted (except by Paine, etc.)

Rather, how might strategic programs be related to the motive of enhancing....

3. How do the hypothesis of such a criterion relate to other explanations of the arms race? What weight should be given it?

4. Likewise, arms control.

5. How might some degree of instability--preemptive incentives on both sides--contribute to a strategy of threatening first use or

escalation? How does this relate to other explanations of the emergence of such instability, including explanations of arms control policies that allow it to emerge?

6. What evidence is there that recent officials under Carter and Reagan have seen a continued, or enhanced, need for US interventions in the TW, and for FU threats? (There is a lot; see Paine, and others). What factors have contributed to this concern?

7. What are the interests that condition these perceptions? how widely are they perceived; how valid the concerns; Are there alternative means of meeting the perceived needs, or lessening risks, or alternative definitions of American commitments or vital needs, that deserve public discussion? (Most speculative)

8. On risks of actual FU: What is the place, if any, of \Just War constraints in the moral universe of Do they have a coherent alternative to it? Might their values lead to actual use?

.....Milgram, Kelman....and role of ethic of obedience...

Evidence from governmental massacres of past: under Stalin, Hitler, strategic bombing by German, Japan, UK and US; terror programs.....

9. Psychology and morality of risk-taking. K and T. etc. LBJ. JFK and Cuba II. Evidence on possibility of getting out of control; deliberate acceptance of this by leaders on both sides, though with some ignorance. Like WWI; see RFK quote at end. (related to LOW, delegation, preemption...)

And see Sorensen quote at end. (Quote this at end.)

10. Significance

--new understanding; new data, new hypotheses; new relationships/ implications of coherence, new framework in which to place real evidence of random, uncontrolled behavior, other factors.

--new sense of danger in current programs

--new sense of time-urgency and high priority with respect to averting certain programs by unilateral means or arms control.

--new criteria for arms control ' ; whole new negotiating approach for both sides. (presented to Soviets) (already reflected in their attitude to CTB and SDI--not yet to offensive weapons).

--new subjects for--and urgency of--public debate and democratic control: need for new understanding by public, new involvement-- questions of values involved--and new directions in foreign relations (perhaps, in identity as Americans in the world).

Interests currently influential need to be identified and challenged.

--Questions of value: relations with Third World, relations with the future, with humanity. Basic to democracy, and to national identity. Sorensen question: we deserved and needed to know JFKs answer to that question, and that of his successors, but ultimately it is not for Presidents to answer that question. It is for us. And it is not even for us alone to answer it. This project focusses, in part on the question, and There is a deeper question: when do people of one nation have the right...? That is not to be answered by the women and men of that nation alone. But we must make a start at confronting the question. This project is part of the contribution I intend to make.